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CASE NOTE 
RETROACTIVITY, STRICKLAND, AND ALIEN CRIMINAL  
DEFENDANTS: HOW THE CHAIDEZ DECISION  
RAISED MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERED 
DANIELLE R. ACKER SUSANJ† 
INTRODUCTION 
When the United States Supreme Court decides to hear a case, it does 
not grant certiorari simply on the case itself—it chooses to answer a “ques-
tion presented” by that case. So in Chaidez v. United States,1 the Court 
granted certiorari on the question “whether the principle articulated in 
Padilla [v. Kentucky] applies to persons whose convictions became final 
before its announcement.”2 But in answering that question, Chaidez left 
unanswered—and raised—even more questions. 
In the 2010 landmark case Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court declared that 
defense lawyers must inform noncitizen criminal defendants of the removal 
consequences of pleading guilty.3 In the years that followed, federal and 
state courts grappled with—and ultimately split over—whether Padilla 
applied only to defendants whose cases were still on direct appeal, or also to 
those whose convictions were final before Padilla. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Chaidez, and, in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, 
upheld the Seventh Circuit’s ruling4 that Padilla established a “new rule” 
not available retroactively.5  
 
† Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 161. J.D., University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wheaton College. 
1 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). 
2 Brief for Petitioner at i, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820), 2012 WL 2948891. 
3 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
4 Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103.  
5 133 S. Ct. at 1107-11. 
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But the Court’s ruling did not address several of the difficult questions 
that come up in retroactivity analysis, particularly for any rule premised on 
Strickland v. Washington.6 It also left many questions open for alien petitioners 
who seek relief from their convictions. Part I of this Note discusses how the 
Court has traditionally handled the retroactive application of rules to habeas 
petitioners and how the issue arose after Padilla. It summarizes the Teague7 
rule for retroactivity and the problem the Padilla decision posed for lower 
courts determining its retroactive application. Part II discusses the Chaidez 
decision and notes the various policy and practical concerns implicated (and 
ignored) in its retroactivity analysis. Part III notes the open questions that 
persist after Chaidez—particularly for petitioners whose lawyers affirmatively 
gave them wrong information at the time they pleaded guilty—and exam-
ines where the Court may be heading with its recent plea jurisprudence. 
Finally, Part III also questions how long Teague and Strickland can function 
together, as new norms in criminal procedure evolve, become prevailing, 
and ultimately gain recognition from courts. 
I. BACKGROUND: RETROACTIVE RULES AND THE GREAT WRIT  
When the Supreme Court requires a procedural protection for criminal 
defendants, often it must determine which criminal defendants should get 
the benefit of that rule. Its current approach is to limit claims under “new” 
rules to defendants whose convictions are on direct review, while allowing 
all petitioners, even those whose convictions are final, to seek the protection 
of rules that are not new. 
A. The Development of Postconviction Review 
The question of when a Supreme Court decision on criminal procedure 
should apply retroactively to cases on collateral review became more compli-
cated as the Warren Court began issuing sweeping rulings, such as Miranda v. 
Arizona8  and Mapp v. Ohio,9  that revolutionized criminal procedure. The 
potentially huge number of petitioners who could have taken advantage of 
those new rules led the Court to determine that retroactivity would not be 
automatic, but would depend on the purpose of the new rule, the extent of 
 
6 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel). 
7 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
8 See 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring certain preinterrogation warnings for individuals taken 
into custody). 
9 See 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule against the 
states).  
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reliance on the old rule, and the effect of retroactive application on the 
administration of justice.10 Justice Harlan criticized the Court’s retroactivity 
approach in his dissents from the line of cases that followed, arguing that all 
decisions should apply retroactively to cases on direct review, but that 
“new” rules should not apply to cases on collateral review.11 Decades later, 
in Griffith v. Kentucky12 and Teague v. Lane,13 the Court adopted Justice 
Harlan’s views about retroactivity. 
B. The Teague Rule 
New constitutional rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively 
to cases on collateral review.14 So in a case like Chaidez, the threshold 
question is whether the rule the petitioner seeks to take advantage of is 
“new.” If it is, the rule applies retroactively only if it falls under one of two 
exceptions: (1) it places new constitutionally protected conduct beyond the 
government’s authority to regulate, or (2) it implicates fundamental fairness 
and bears on guilt or innocence.15 While the Supreme Court has handled 
the question of retroactivity multiple times and has provided some guid-
ance, the contours of what constitutes a new rule remain fuzzy. Some have 
 
10 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1241 (6th ed. 2009) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967)). 
11 See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, ��� U.S. ��� (1987); see also FALLON, JR. ET AL., 
supra note 10, at 1241-42 (presenting Justice Harlan’s position). 
12 479 U.S. at 321-23. 
13 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). Although Teague was a plurality decision, 
subsequent majorities of the Court have accepted its approach. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302, 313 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also 
FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 10, at 1242. Teague controls retroactivity analysis for many types 
of postconviction review of both federal and state convictions. However, the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of ���� (AEDPA) limits retroactivity for habeas petitions filed under 
the Act that seek federal review of a state conviction, if a state court has already ruled on the 
merits of the claim being raised. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).  
14 The Court has held that Teague applies only to rules of criminal procedure, not to substan-
tive rules of criminal law. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998). 
15 Teague, 489 U.S. at 290; FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 10, at 1245-46. The first excep-
tion relates to new rules governing “primary conduct,” which apply retroactively because they 
place certain actions outside of the government’s power, or protect certain conduct from 
government interference or regulation. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004) 
(citations omitted). Under the second exception, rules will be retroactive only if they are 
“watershed” rules of criminal procedure, “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is 
seriously diminished.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313. While the Court has never found such a rule, it 
has suggested repeatedly that the rule articulated in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 
would have fallen under this exception. See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, ��� U.S. ���, 495 (1990). 
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argued, however, that “it is clear that the Court generally defines a new rule 
expansively and instances where rules have retroactive application narrowly.”16 
A rule that “‘breaks new ground,’ ‘imposes a new obligation on the 
States or the Federal Government,’ or was not ‘dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final’” may be new, 
the Court has said.17 When finding that a case announces a new rule, the 
Court has often discussed whether reasonable jurists disagreed on the issue 
prior to the Court’s decision. 18  Teague’s “‘new rule’ principle therefore 
validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made 
by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.”19 
If lower courts have been split, that conflict militates toward a rule being new.20  
The easiest way to identify a new rule is if it overrules prior precedent.21 
On the other hand, a rule is not new if it was dictated by precedent that 
controlled or required the outcome. The question “is more difficult . . . 
when a decision extends the reasoning” of previous cases.22 Justice Kennedy 
pondered this question in his concurrence in Wright v. West, in which the 
Court considered a criminal procedure rule that required a case-by-case 
evaluation of what is rational: “Where the beginning point is . . . a rule 
designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, 
it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new 
rule, one not dictated by precedent.”23 
 
16 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 939 (5th ed. 2007). 
17 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301); see also O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 
U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (considering these factors). 
18 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 (2004) (stating that the differing of reasonable 
jurists points to a new rule); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 395 (1994) (same); Graham v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467-68 (1993) (same). 
19 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990). 
20 See, e.g., Caspari, 510 U.S. at ��� (relying largely on lower court division in finding a new 
rule). But see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-10 (2000) (stating, in the context of 28 U.S.C. 
§ ����(d)(�), that conflict among courts alone is not sufficient to show a new rule). 
21 See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, ��� U.S. ���, ��� (����) (finding Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), to establish a new rule because it overruled prior governing precedent). 
22 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488. See generally Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233-41 (1990) (discuss-
ing at length whether the rule announced by Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), was 
dictated by prior cases). 
23 505 U.S. 277, 308-09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The Wright Court 
considered the application of the standard for sufficiency of evidence established in Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)—“whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Wright, 505 U.S. at 308. 
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C. Padilla v. Kentucky 
On the advice of his lawyer, Jose Padilla pleaded guilty to a drug 
trafficking offense, which made him eligible for removal.24 Padilla filed for 
postconviction relief, arguing that his lawyer had told him that he “did not 
have to worry about” being deported, which deprived him of the effective 
assistance of counsel in his decision to plead guilty.25 The Supreme Court of 
Kentucky ruled without an evidentiary hearing that Padilla had not stated a 
claim for denial of effective assistance of counsel because he was not entitled 
to effective assistance regarding collateral consequences.26  The Supreme 
Court of Kentucky was the first court to hold that misadvice could not 
constitute ineffective assistance,27 but most federal and state courts before 
Padilla had held that defense attorneys were not required to give affirmative 
advice on the collateral consequences of guilty pleas, including removal.28 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, with five Justices joining the 
holding that “constitutionally competent counsel would have advised” that a 
conviction would make the defendant subject to removal, if that conse-
quence were clear.29 The Court placed this requirement under the Strickland 
line of cases; it ruled that a defense attorney’s failure to advise that a 
conviction would make a defendant automatically deportable violated the 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.30 Under Strick-
land, the Court asked whether the defense attorney’s conduct “fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.”31 The Court measures this by the 
“practice and expectations of the legal community,” 32  examined “under 
prevailing professional norms.”33 Those norms, the Padilla Court concluded, 
recognized that providing advice on deportation consequences was a duty of 
the criminal defense attorney.34  The Court noted that it had previously 
recognized in INS v. St. Cyr that removal consequences are relevant to the 
 
24 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 & n.1 (2010). 
25 Id. at 1478 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
26 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484-85 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1473. 
27 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1493-94 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
28 Id. at 1487 (citations omitted); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) 
(reviewing lower court decisions). 
29 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1483 (majority opinion). 
30 See id. at 1482, 1486-87. Strickland’s standard for ineffective assistance of counsel was first 
applied to guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). 
31 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
34 Id. at 1482-83. 
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decision whether to plead guilty.35 According to the Court, “For at least the 
past 15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on 
counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a client’s 
plea.”36 Further, the Court observed that it had never held relevant the 
distinction between direct criminal consequences and collateral consequences 
of conviction in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel.37 
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts, suggested that the Court’s opinion was too broad. Justice 
Alito would have held that constitutionally effective counsel (1) must refrain 
from “unreasonably providing incorrect advice,” and (2) should inform 
defendants that pleading guilty “may have adverse immigration conse-
quences” and advise them to contact an immigration attorney for more 
information.38 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing 
that the Sixth Amendment only “guarantees the accused a lawyer ‘for his 
defense’ against a ‘criminal prosecutio[n],’” and that therefore the majority 
was “swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.”39 
The Padilla opinion did not address whether it would apply retroactively. 
So in the following years, lower courts split over whether Padilla applied to 
petitioners whose convictions were already final.40 
II. THE CHAIDEZ DECISION 
A. Background of the Case 
Roselva Chaidez entered the United States from Mexico, and in 1977 
became a legal permanent resident.41 In 2003, she was charged with three 
counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance fraud scheme and, 
later that year, on the advice of her attorney, pleaded guilty to two of the 
 
35 Id. at 1483 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)). 
36 Id. at 1485. 
37 Id. at 1481. 
38 Id. at 1487, 1494 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
39 Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
40 Compare United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that Padilla 
applies retroactively), and Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 899-901, 907 (Mass. 2011) 
(same), with United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that Padilla does 
not apply retroactively), United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011) (same), 
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011) (same), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013), 
and State v. Gaitan, 37 A.3d 1089, 1107 (N.J. 2012) (same). The Fourth Circuit similarly noted that 
“nothing in the Padilla decision indicates that it is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 
review.” United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, 404 F. App’x 714, 715 n.* (4th Cir. 2010). 
41 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686. 
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counts and received a sentence of four years of probation.42 Because the 
federal fraud charges to which Chaidez pleaded guilty involved more than 
$10,000, she became eligible for removal as an aggravated felon, and removal 
proceedings began in 2009.43 Chaidez then sought to have her conviction 
overturned, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney 
failed to tell her that pleading guilty to mail fraud could lead to her removal.44 
While Chaidez’s petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Pa-
dilla. The district court hearing Chaidez’s petition determined that Padilla 
was not a new rule,45 granted her petition, and vacated her conviction.46 The 
government appealed, claiming that Padilla was a new rule that should not 
have been applied retroactively, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding 
for the government.47 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,48 perhaps influenced by the Solici-
tor General’s (SG) brief supporting review.49 The SG’s brief argued that 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision was correct but that this “recurring” issue “of 
substantial importance” had resulted in a direct conflict among the courts of 
appeals.50 The SG’s sole commentary on the case’s appropriateness as a 
vehicle was an assertion that it would be “suitable,” citing to Chaidez’s own 
petition for certiorari.51 While the SG argued that the two Teague exceptions 
to nonretroactivity for new rules did not apply in Chaidez,52 it did not note 
that Chaidez had, in fact, waived the argument that the Padilla rule could fit 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (“Any alien who is 
convicted of [fraud in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000] is deportable.”). 
44 Chaidez, ��� F.�d at ���. Because Chaidez was not in custody when she filed her petition, 
she filed a writ of coram nobis, which allows a petitioner who is no longer “in custody”—and so 
ineligible for habeas relief—to collaterally attack her conviction. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106 n.1; 
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686. 
45 United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2010), rev’d, 655 F.3d 684, 
aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103. 
46 United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 
2010), rev’d, 655 F.3d 684, aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103. 
47 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686, 694. 
48 Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012). 
49 Cf. RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 23 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari 
petitions from the SG, or from those the SG supports, than from any other party).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
50 Brief for the United States at 8, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820), 2012 WL 1097108. 
51 See id. at 21 (“This case is a suitable vehicle for the Court to resolve the question of Pa-
dilla’s retroactivity. The question is squarely presented and determinative of petitioner’s right to 
relief.” (citations omitted)). 
52 Id. at 11. 
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the exceptions53—meaning that if the Court found Padilla to be a new rule 
and therefore nonretroactive, it would be less appropriate for the Court to go 
on and analyze the exceptions, as it typically has in Teague cases. 
B. The Decision 
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court held that, under a Teague analysis, 
“Padilla does not have retroactive effect.”54 According to Teague, the Court 
observed, a rule is not new when it applies a general standard to “the kind 
of factual circumstances it was meant to address”; “garden-variety applica-
tions” of Strickland are not new.55 But the majority characterized Padilla as 
having answered a threshold question before analyzing the Strickland issue 
of ineffective assistance: first, the Padilla Court had to determine if “advice 
about deportation” was “‘categorically removed’ from the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.”56 Because the Padilla Court, before deter-
mining how Strickland applied, first had to decide whether Strickland applied, 
its answer “required a new rule.”57 
The opinion also places great weight on another Teague factor—whether 
reasonable jurists disagreed about the classification of the rule. At multiple 
points, the opinion notes that a rule is new unless it would have been 
“apparent to all reasonable jurists,” phrasing taken from the Court’s deci-
sion in Lambrix v. Singletary, an earlier Teague case.58 The Court noted that 
following Hill v. Lockhart,59 in which the Court left open “whether advice 
concerning a collateral consequence must satisfy Sixth Amendment 
requirements,” lower courts had concluded “almost unanimously” that it did 
not.60 Because Padilla’s holding “that the failure to advise about a non-
criminal consequence could violate the Sixth Amendment” was not “apparent 
 
53 See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2011), aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (“The 
parties agree that . . . neither exception to non-retroactivity applies.”). 
54 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1105. Noting that he “continue[s] to believe that Padilla was wrongly 
decided,” Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 1113-14 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment). Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented. Id. at 1114 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
55 Id. at 1107 (majority opinion); see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
56 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108 (citation omitted). 
57 Id. 
58 See, e.g., id. at 1107, 1111 (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528 (1997)). 
59 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
60 See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108-09 (noting that ten federal appellate courts and almost thirty 
state courts had so held, while only two state courts thought that failure to advise as to deportation 
or other collateral consequences could violate the Sixth Amendment). 
12 Susanj Final Link Fixed.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/16/2014 2:16 PM 
2013] How Chaidez Raised More Questions than It Answered 63 
to all reasonable jurists,” it was a new rule, the Court said.61 The Court 
acknowledged that there was not the same consensus before Padilla against 
claims premised on a lawyer’s misadvice. But it set to the side the category 
of misadvice62 before again concluding that Chaidez had not established 
“that all reasonable judges, prior to Padilla, thought they were living in a 
Padilla-like world.”63 
Interestingly, the footnotes in the decision read like the seeds of the 
vehicle section of a good brief in opposition to certiorari—a brief that was 
not written, of course, because the SG acquiesced in the grant of certiorari. 
The Court had to note that (1) it was assuming, without deciding, that the 
fact that Chaidez petitioned for a writ of coram nobis rather than habeas 
corpus was irrelevant;64  (2) Chaidez had not argued that either Teague 
exception applied; 65  (3) it was not evaluating whether Teague, with its 
emphasis on federalism and comity, is inapplicable to federal convictions;66 
(4) it was not deciding whether Padilla claims must remain available on 
collateral review because they cannot be brought earlier;67 and (5) misadvice 
was not present in Chaidez’s claim.68 
C. The Dissent 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that 
Padilla “did nothing more than apply the existing rule of Strickland . . . in a 
new setting, the same way the Court has done repeatedly in the past.”69 
Padilla, she said, was a “straightforward” application of Strickland, “rooted in 
15 years of professional standards and the Court’s prior St. Cyr decision,” 
and so was not a new rule.70 In fact, she observed that the Court had “never 
found that an application of Strickland resulted in a new rule” before 
 
61 Id. at 1111 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
62 See id. at 1112 (noting that the rule in some circuits “that a lawyer may not affirmatively 
misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client on any important matter” had 
“co-existed happily with precedent” holding that a defendant need not be advised of the deporta-
tion consequences of a guilty plea). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1106 n.1. For an explanation of the writ, see supra note 44. 
65 Id. at 1107 n.3. 
66 Id. at 1113 n.16. Chaidez failed to adequately raise this argument below or at the certiorari 
stage. Id. 
67 Id. Chaidez also failed to raise this argument before the merits stage. Id. 
68 Id. at 1112. 
69 Id. at 1114 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 1120. 
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Chaidez. 71  Justice Sotomayor argued that the Padilla rule should be no 
different, for when the Court “merely” applies Strickland “in a way that 
corresponds to an evolution in professional norms,” it makes “no new law.”72  
She also took the majority to task for “fail[ing] to account for the devel-
opment of professional standards over time” when surveying the law of the 
lower courts before Padilla.73 In more recent years, she noted, lower courts 
had made an exception to earlier case law by allowing Strickland claims to go 
forward where lawyers had made “affirmative misstatements about the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.”74 These decisions, she argued, 
had already breached the divide between direct and collateral consequences.75 
D. Evaluating the Decision 
While the Chaidez decision answered (in the negative) the question 
whether Chaidez could successfully raise a Padilla claim, it left open more 
issues than it clarified and failed to comment on many considerations the 
Court has traditionally found to be important in Teague cases. 
1. “Reasonable Jurists” 
Justice Kagan followed the lead of many of the Court’s previous deci-
sions by relying heavily on the fact that the Padilla rule was not “apparent 
to all reasonable jurists.” As the dissent noted, “What truly appears to drive 
the majority’s analysis is its sense that Padilla occasioned a serious disrup-
tion in lower court decisional reasoning.”76 Generally, if the Court discusses 
“reasonable jurists” in a Teague case, the habeas petitioner is doomed.77 The 
“reasonable jurists” language is found nowhere in Teague, but rather seems 
to have developed later; most cases cite to Lambrix v. Singletary78 when 
discussing this factor.79 The Lambrix Court, in turn, relied on language from 
Butler v. McKellar that asked whether the rule was “susceptible to debate 
 
71 Id. at 1114-��, ���� n.� (citing Lafler v. Cooper, ��� S. Ct. ���� (����); Rompilla v. Beard, 
545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)). 
72 Id. at 1115. 
73 Id. at 1118. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1119. 
76 Id. at 1120. 
77 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
78 520 U.S. 518 (1997). 
79 See, e.g., Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 (majority opinion). 
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among reasonable minds,”80 similar to the formulation in Sawyer v. Smith of 
whether “reasonable jurists may disagree.”81  
But while the Court consistently discusses this factor when finding a 
rule to be new, it tends to ignore or downplay it when finding a rule to be 
retroactive. In Williams v. Taylor, Justice Stevens stated that Teague’s 
emphasis on respecting “‘reasonable, good-faith interpretations’ by state 
courts is an explanation of policy, not a statement of law.”82 The Court 
went on to explain,  
“[E]ven though [this Court has] characterized the new rule inquiry as 
whether ‘reasonable jurists’ could disagree as to whether a result is dictated 
by precedent, the standard for determining when a case establishes a new 
rule is ‘objective,’ and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not 
necessarily mean a rule is new.”83  
And in Stringer v. Black, the Court made no mention of “reasonable ju-
rists” when it asserted that the court of appeals below had acted unreasona-
bly—according to an “objective standard”—by not applying Supreme Court 
precedent.84 It was left to the three dissenters to note that the Court’s 
holding implied that “no reasonable jurist” could have believed that certain 
precedent cases did not apply to the petitioner, even though the dissent 
itself did not think the Court’s holding was so “obvious.”85 
This reliance on the existence of disagreement among reasonable jurists 
begins to seem like a bit of post hoc rationalization when it surfaces only in 
cases where the rule is found to be new. It is worth asking, then, how 
helpful the formulation really is. For a Court with a docket made up in 
large part of circuit splits,86 where, by definition, presumably reasonable 
jurists explicitly disagree, it will be the unusual case in which the Court 
issues a rule that was already universally predicted, or at least not contra-
vened, by lower courts. Any time the Court took up a case presenting a 
 
80 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990); see also Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528. 
81 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990). 
82 529 U.S. 362, 383 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.). Although the Williams Court discussed 
Teague, Williams was in fact an AEDPA case. See id. at 375. 
83 Id. at 410 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted in original) (quoting Wright v. 
West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
84 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992) (noting that the court below was bound by Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U.S. 420 (1980)). 
85 Id. at 238 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
86 See John S. Summers & Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure and Understanding 
of U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S. L. WK. 393, 393 (Sept. 27, 2011) 
(finding that from October Term 2005 through October Term 2010, 37.8% of the Court’s merits 
cases presented circuit splits). 
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circuit split, either to reverse a lower court or even to write an opinion that 
was not unanimous, this factor would require that the Court’s rule be 
labeled “new.”87 But allowing the “reasonable jurists” factor to dictate the 
outcome would override the various considerations that led to the Teague 
doctrine.88 In fact, Justice O’Connor, the author of Teague, once observed 
that the “‘all reasonable jurists’ standard would tend to mislead federal 
habeas courts by focusing their attention on a subjective inquiry rather than 
on an objective one.” 89  Indeed, even Justice Kagan noted in Chaidez, 
“Dissents have been known to exaggerate the novelty of majority opinions; 
and ‘the mere existence of a dissent,’ like the existence of conflicting 
authority in state or lower federal courts, does not establish that a rule is 
new.”90  This acknowledgment seems to undermine the majority’s heavy 
reliance on the “reasonable jurists” factor.  
It may be time to abandon the “reasonable jurists” factor as an indicator 
of a new rule under Teague. Although the “reasonable jurists” factor reflects 
Teague’s concern with respecting lower courts, it does not appear to be 
helping the Court reach its decisions. The Court has seemingly abandoned 
the factor when it decides that a rule is not new—likely because in a case 
where a rule is made retroactive, a majority’s discussion of the factor would 
only highlight the implication that any lower courts—and dissenting 
Justices—who opposed that rule were “unreasonable.”91 And if the Court 
only discusses the factor in decisions that conclude that a rule is new, it 
seems that the factor contributes little to the Court’s analysis; rather, it 
merely supports an already-reached decision that a rule is new. 
2. Leaving Open the Issue of Misadvice 
The scope of the majority opinion and the apparent understanding of 
the dissent seem to leave open the possibility that the Chaidez decision 
applies only to the failure to give advice, while claims of misadvice may 
remain available to habeas petitioners on collateral review. Chaidez alleged 
that her attorney failed to advise her whether her guilty plea could result in 
 
87 Disagreement among reasonable jurists does not include, of course, situations such as 
summary reversals where a lower court explicitly refuses to follow established precedent. 
88 See infra subsection II.D.3. 
89 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). 
90 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 n.11 (2013) (citations omitted). 
91 Cf. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 n.5 (2004) (“Because the focus of the inquiry is 
whether reasonable jurists could differ as to whether precedent compels the sought-for rule, we do 
not suggest that the mere existence of a dissent suffices to show that the rule is new.”). 
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removal.92 Padilla, by contrast, alleged that his lawyer had affirmatively 
misled him by telling him that his guilty plea would not make him eligible 
for deportation.93 Padilla’s counsel advocated for the broad rule that the 
Court ultimately adopted, but as a fallback position, also suggested that the 
Court could rule simply that misadvice is a Sixth Amendment violation, 
without establishing an affirmative duty.94 But because Chaidez was not 
alleging misadvice, her counsel had no incentive to advocate for a mixed 
rule on retroactivity. As yet another consequence of the Court’s taking 
Chaidez as its vehicle on this issue, the parties did not raise the possibility of 
the retroactivity of one part of the Padilla rule but not of the other. 
As a result, it appears to be an open question whether, after Chaidez, 
claims of misadvice are available on collateral review.95 This speculation 
hinges in part on the fact that the government almost conceded that point 
at oral argument. Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben stated, in 
response to a question from Justice Sotomayor, “I would probably not 
disagree that misadvice claim was not new before Padilla and it’s not really 
addressed by Padilla’s rationale.”96 The Chaidez opinion itself furthered the 
ambiguity of Mr. Dreeben’s “probably not.” The Court noted that the 
Padilla decision had determined not to exempt “a lawyer’s advice (or non-
advice) about a plea’s deportation risk” from “Sixth Amendment scrutiny,” 
and had applied the Strickland test when a lawyer “gives (or fails to give) 
advice about immigration consequences.”97 Those statements could imply 
that the rule the Court was considering encompassed both misadvice and 
non-advice. But the Court went on to reject Chaidez’s argument that the 
lower court cases prohibiting misadvice demonstrated that the Padilla rule 
was not new. While three federal circuits and some state courts had held 
misstatements to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court 
described the rule established by those decisions as “only that a lawyer may 
 
92 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106. 
93 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
94 Brief of Petitioner at i, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1497552. This, of 
course, is the position that Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, ultimately took in 
Padilla. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
95 See, e.g., MICHAEL K. MEHR, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF IN CALIFORNIA SHOULD BE UNAFFECTED BY CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STATES 2 (2013), 
available at http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc-pcr_in_calif_not_affected_by_chaidez_march_ 
2013.pdf (assuming that misadvice claims will be available retroactively for habeas petitioners); 
Benach Ragland LLP, Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Chaidez, LIFTED LAMP (Feb. 22, 
2013), http://liftedlamp.wordpress.com/2013/02/22/thoughts-on-the-supreme-courts-opinion-in-chaidez 
(questioning the status of misadvice claims on collateral review). 
96 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (No. 11-820), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-820.pdf. 
97 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. 
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not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead 
his client on any important matter.”98 Those decisions, the Court said, “co-
existed happily with precedent, from the same jurisdictions (and almost all 
others), holding that deportation” did not warrant an exception to the 
collateral consequences rule.99 And this “separate rule for material misrepre-
sentations” did “not apply to Chaidez’s case” but had “lived in harmony 
with the exclusion of claims like hers from the Sixth Amendment.”100 
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s characterization of the signifi-
cance of lower court precedent on misadvice, but seemed to further the idea 
that the majority was not ruling on the retroactivity of the misadvice rule. 
The dissent characterized lower court rulings that permitted misadvice 
claims as recognizing “an important exception to the collateral/direct 
consequences distinction.”101 But, the dissent noted, the majority looked at 
misadvice cases as having “merely applied the age-old principle that a 
lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a client.”102 
Thus, much of the majority’s language and the dissent’s understanding 
of the majority support the idea that what the Court held in Chaidez was 
that the affirmative duty to advise a client about removal consequences was 
not retroactive. But the status of the rule preventing a lawyer from misad-
vising a client about removal consequences seems to remain in limbo. 
3. (Not) Dealing with Habeas Policy and the  
   Practical Consequences of Retroactivity  
Although none of the opinions spends much time contemplating policy 
or practical consequences, it is worth considering how the outcome of 
Chaidez fits with the sometimes competing purposes and policies that 
underlie habeas review. Particularly, it seems that many of these considera-
tions support at least part of the majority’s decision, while presenting some 
cautionary principles for the outcome the dissent would have adopted. 
Habeas review must protect the role of the judiciary and the finality of its 
decisions and respect federalism concerns over the relationship between 
state and federal courts, while also ensuring accuracy, equality, and finality 
in the administration of justice.103 
 
98 Id. at 1112. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1119 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. 
103 For an overview of the various policy considerations at issue, see CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 16, at 891-95. 
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a. Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary 
Overturning a lower court conviction, particularly on habeas review 
many years after the criminal proceedings began, raises hard questions 
about the role of the judiciary. Part of the debate over retroactivity hinges 
on what it has to say about the role of judges in our judicial system. One 
view, attributed to Blackstone, is that judges, rather than making law, 
declare what the law is. 104  Under this logic, a judicial decision should 
typically have retroactive effect, because it simply declares what the law 
always was.105 At the same time, “there is also recognition that unrestrained 
application [of this principle] could create chaos in the judicial system,”106 
which is why principles of restraint like the Teague rule limit the retroactivity 
of claims on collateral review. 
The Supreme Court has also expressed a desire to respect, rather than 
overturn, the good faith decisions of lower courts made in reliance on 
precedent.107 One of the concerns expressed in Teague was respect for the 
“interests of comity and finality” of lower court decisions.108 The Supreme 
Court has seemed sympathetic to the concerns of state court judges, noting 
that state courts “are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply 
existing constitutional law only to have a federal court discover . . . new 
constitutional commands.”109 Additionally, states and their courts are the 
initial arbiters of much of criminal law; they “possess primary authority for 
defining and enforcing the criminal law. . . . Federal intrusions into state 
criminal trials frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders 
and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.” 110  As the 
Court has expressed, limits on habeas “reflect our enduring respect for ‘the 
State’s interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct 
review within the state court system.’”111  
This respect suggests that state court convictions on federal habeas re-
view, like Jose Padilla’s, should be treated carefully by lower federal courts, 
and helps explain why the Supreme Court chose in Chaidez not to make 
 
104 Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 105, 
107 (2010); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
105 Allen, supra note 104, at 108. 
106 Id. at 109. 
107 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 939-40. 
108 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion). Allowing criminal law 
decisions to remain final also enhances the deterrent effect of judges’ rulings. Id. at 309. 
109 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n.33 (1982). 
110 Id. at 128 (citation omitted). 
111 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (citations omitted). 
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retroactive a rule that would threaten state court convictions. But Chaidez 
sought review of a federal conviction. Although the Court did not consider 
the significance of the federal nature of Chaidez’s conviction (because 
Chaidez had waived this argument),112 the federalism rationale of Teague 
cannot support a limit on federal review of federal convictions. Additionally, 
AEDPA governs retroactivity when the state has ruled on the merits of a 
claim on postconviction review,113 so Teague now applies only when the 
state has not reached the merits of the issue, making the desire to respect 
state courts’ decisional reasoning somewhat less of a concern. But, had 
Chaidez made Padilla retroactive, state courts would have been bound by the 
decision, so state court convictions would have been unsettled even though 
the conviction on review before the Court was federal. 114  Additionally, 
Teague’s commitment to respecting the good faith interpretations of lower 
courts remains salient whether the lower court is state or federal. Notably, 
although Chaidez made Padilla nonretroactive, state courts are still free to 
apply the rule retroactively;115 it is possible that Padilla could be retroactive 
in some states even though it is not retroactive in the federal system. 
Another relevant concern in deciding retroactivity is the extent to which 
we need a federal court to police a rule by making it retroactive. The Warren 
Court was concerned with the reluctance of some state courts to enforce 
constitutional protections for all individuals; some have argued that the 
Rehnquist Court then saw this as the driving purpose of federal habeas 
review, considering that review to be less important where state reluctance 
had diminished.116 This has interesting implications for the Padilla rule, which 
is based on evolving professional norms—norms that could have changed 
earlier in some jurisdictions than in others. Since some state courts already 
had rules similar to Padilla, retroactive application may have been less 
necessary; many state criminal defendants benefitted from the protection of 
some form of the Padilla rule anyway. Furthermore, as Justice Alito noted in 
his concurrence in Padilla, the flexible standard governing the withdrawal of 
 
112 See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 n.16 (2013). 
113 See supra note 13 (discussing AEDPA’s limits on retroactivity). 
114 It remains an open question whether state courts are bound to apply retroactively “watershed” 
rules that are retroactive under Teague. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 n.4 (2008). 
115 See id. at 266 (holding that state courts may apply “new” rules of criminal procedure ret-
roactively, even if federal courts may not). 
116 See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2425 (1993) (char-
acterizing the Rehnquist Court’s view of the purpose of habeas corpus as “deter[ring] the state 
courts from ignoring fundamental federal rights”). 
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guilty pleas could encompass pleas made on incomplete or incorrect infor-
mation, so state judges could permit withdrawal regardless of Padilla.117  
b. Equality and Accuracy Concerns in Retroactivity 
Concerns the Teague Court stressed repeatedly, and that are always 
implicated in determining the retroactivity of decisions, are the equal 
administration of law and the accuracy of convictions resulting from that 
administration.  
The Warren Court’s three-factor balancing test for determining whether 
a rule would be retroactive118 had the effect of not always applying all rules 
equally to all petitioners.119 Concern over the equal administration of justice 
was one of the driving themes of the Teague opinion; the plurality stated 
that “the harm caused by the failure to treat similarly situated defendants 
alike cannot be exaggerated.”120 Padilla’s conviction was already final when 
the Supreme Court decided his case, but the rule in Padilla was nevertheless 
applied to him. This means that now that the rule is not retroactive, he was 
treated unequally compared to others whose convictions were also final but 
who cannot receive the benefit of the rule—like Chaidez.  
The Teague plurality also noted that “our cases have moved in the direc-
tion of reaffirming the relevance of the likely accuracy of convictions in 
determining the available scope of habeas review.” 121 This consideration 
explains the second exception to Teague—watershed rules that could go to 
the innocence of a defendant or the accuracy of his conviction should apply 
retroactively.122 Accuracy concerns also led the Court to continue to allow 
claims of Miranda violations on habeas review, after foreclosing, in Stone v. 
Powell, claims on habeas for Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule viola-
tions already litigated in state court.123 The Court stated that a defendant’s 
inculpatory statements made without Miranda warnings would be less 
 
117 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting other ways courts could have addressed the problems presented in the case). 
118 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
119 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that the Court’s 
earlier approach to retroactivity resulted in “unequal treatment of those who were similarly 
situated”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1744-45 (1991) (characterizing the Court’s 
decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, ��� U.S. ��� (����), as based in part on the desire to undo the 
inequality of earlier approaches to retroactivity). 
120 Teague, 489 U.S. at 315. 
121 Id. at 313 (citations omitted). 
122 Id. at 311, 313. 
123 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993) (declining to extend the rule in 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to habeas claims premised on Miranda violations). 
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reliable as evidence on which to base the determination of guilt or inno-
cence at trial.124 Thus, the Miranda rule could bear on the “correct ascer-
tainment of guilt.”125 The accuracy of a conviction is of less concern in 
Padilla claims, however. Miranda claims at least go to statements that will 
be used in the determination of guilt; Padilla claims, however, go simply to 
a defendant’s decision to plead guilty. What drives this decision may be 
strategy or a concern about consequences, but it does not assist in determin-
ing whether the defendant actually committed the crime.  
c. Lack of Finality 
Retroactivity disturbs final convictions, frustrating both the victims of 
crime and the public—a problem that Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting 
opinion does not acknowledge. Although Padilla himself was convicted of 
drug trafficking, a “victimless” crime, and Chaidez was convicted of fraud 
on an insurance company, perhaps an unsympathetic victim, others who 
would have raised Padilla claims on habeas may have left behind victims. 
Those who challenge their sentences on habeas typically do so years after 
the original crimes took place. The Court has noted, “Only with an assur-
ance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment in a case. Only 
with real finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral 
judgment will be carried out.”126 Postconviction review also places heavy 
financial costs on courts, often requiring years of litigation.127 The Chaidez 
dissent could have refuted this finality criticism by noting that petitioners 
under Strickland must show that the ineffective assistance of counsel preju-
diced the defense.128 Showing prejudice has typically been very difficult for 
petitioners,129 making it unlikely that even retroactive application of Padilla 
would have freed large numbers of convicted criminals. But it still would 
have involved the time and expense of additional litigation. 
 
124 Id. at 692 (citations omitted).  
125 Id. 
126 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998). 
127 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (citation omitted). 
128 See Strickland v. Washington, ��� U.S. ���, ��� (����) (“[A]ny deficiencies in counsel’s 
performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under 
the Constitution.”). 
129 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 n.12 (2010). 
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
The Chaidez decision leaves open several questions about what claims 
might still be available to alien criminal defendants. As noted above, the 
Court in Chaidez was ambiguous as to whether its rule covers misadvice, 
raising the question whether those whose convictions are final might still 
raise misadvice claims. The decision also sharpens the debate over where 
the Court has been coming from—and where it is headed—in plea bargain-
ing and “crimmigration” law. Finally, the decision avoids dealing with the 
question of how a standard built on norms that can change (i.e., Strickland) 
can apply retroactively; in the future, the Court should grapple with this issue. 
A. What About Misadvice? 
The Chaidez decision seems to leave open whether claims of misadvice 
regarding removal consequences are available to petitioners whose convic-
tions were final before Padilla. 130  While we know the duty to provide 
affirmative removal advice is not retroactive, arguments could remain open 
to alien petitioners who seek relief in federal court from a plea they accept-
ed after their attorney told them it would not subject them to removal. And 
of course, these same arguments could be raised in state court, along with 
the argument that state courts need not follow the Supreme Court’s lead on 
Padilla’s nonretroactivity.131 
Under the Chaidez majority’s heavy reliance on the views of reasonable 
jurists, retroactivity of the misadvice prohibition is less problematic than 
retroactivity of the affirmative duty. Chaidez’s attorneys faced an uphill 
battle in convincing a majority of the Court that the affirmative duty was 
not a new rule; after all, four of the Justices—those who concurred in or 
dissented from Padilla—had not even thought the rule was correct, let alone 
not novel.132 On retroactivity then, presumably Chaidez started four votes 
down. But on the issue of misadvice, seven Justices were in agreement: the 
concurring Justices in Padilla agreed that Strickland prevented it, and 
asserted that such a ruling would “not require any upheaval in the law.”133 
As Justice Alito observed, no lower courts, other than the Kentucky Supreme 
Court, had held that affirmative misadvice could “never give rise to ineffective 
 
130 See supra subsection II.D.2. 
131 See supra text accompanying note 115.  
132 Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 96, at 15 (“Justice Scalia: ‘But you, on the 
other hand, would agree, would you not, that those who dissented from [Padilla] would regard it as 
a new rule?’ Mr. Fisher: ‘That’s a tricky question to answer, Justice Scalia.’ Justice Scalia: ‘Well, I 
think it’s an easy question to answer.’”). 
133 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1493 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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assistance,”134 so his approach prohibiting misadvice would not have contra-
vened the lower courts to the same extent that the majority opinion did. 
Forcing one outlier state to follow retroactively the rule against misadvice 
seems much less threatening to Teague’s values of federalism and respect for 
lower courts.135 Just as Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben had conceded that 
the rule against misadvice was “probably not” new and “not really addressed 
by Padilla’s rationale,”136 so also the Chaidez majority called it “a separate 
rule for material misrepresentations,”137 while the dissent referred to it as “the 
age-old principle that a lawyer may not affirmatively mislead a client.”138 
Additionally, concerns about what conduct can fairly be expected from 
defense attorneys are less of an issue for the retroactivity of the rule against 
misadvice. It seems particularly unfair to scrutinize retroactively the 
conduct of defense lawyers who had little warning—depending on the 
strength of the professional norms around them—that their role included an 
affirmative duty to provide correct information on removal consequences. 
But it is not a stretch to assume that defense attorneys would not feel free 
to give patently wrong advice to a client—even on a topic beyond the scope 
of their representation. It seems far less reasonable to expect defense 
attorneys to have always appreciated the eventual Padilla rule, with its duty 
to advise clients on clear removal consequences. Defense lawyers in some 
states, in fact, already had been told that they did not need to worry about 
providing such advice. But no state (until Kentucky in the Padilla case) had 
ever declared that misadvice had no constitutional implications. And it seems 
most unfair to deny relief to those individuals who received patently wrong 
information that was integral to their ultimate decision to plead guilty.  
Further, since many states, and presumably individual defense counsel, 
already recognized this rule concerning misadvice, retroactivity would likely 
result in relatively few habeas petitions. This cuts against the prohibition on 
misadvice being a new rule, as it was a preexisting duty in many states. It 
also addresses some equality issues. Since Padilla received both misadvice 
and the benefit of the rule in his case, so too would others who were 
similarly situated. Additionally, assuming that many defense lawyers had 
been operating under the prevailing norm against misadvice, retroactive 
 
134 Id. at 1494. 
135 See id.; see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1118 & n.6 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the agreement among lower courts regarding the treatment of affirmative 
misstatements). 
136 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 96, at 32. 
137 Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112 (majority opinion). 
138 Id. at 1119 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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application would provide relief to the few defendants who did not receive 
such a lawyer. Finally, while the decision to take a plea seems to imply a 
defendant’s guilt, the presence of misadvice makes this conclusion less 
certain. A defendant who had been positively informed that the decision to 
plead guilty would not result in deportation might decide to plead guilty—
even, presumably, if she were innocent—in order to avoid the risk of going 
to trial on a more serious charge that might result in deportation. But a 
defendant who was not advised one way or the other would seem less likely 
to have made such an explicit decision. In this way, misadvice could actually 
bear on whether the administration of law leads to accurate convictions. 
B. A New Direction After All? 
The Chaidez Court’s decision that the Padilla rule was “new” adds an 
interesting dimension to the debate over what the Court has been doing in 
its recent plea bargaining jurisprudence. Over the past few years, the Court 
has expanded the claims available, often on habeas, to petitioners who allege 
flaws in the way their pleas came about. 
Strickland’s reasonableness requirement has long been viewed as a weak 
one;139 tales abound of shocking defense attorney conduct that has been 
upheld under Strickland.140 The Court may be expanding Strickland’s reach, 
however; alongside Padilla, it has recently issued other decisions that 
strengthen the demands of Strickland,141 among them the duty to investigate 
potential mitigating factors in capital cases.142 More recently, the Court 
held in Missouri v. Frye that, “as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty 
to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on 
terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused,” and that failure 
to communicate offers constitutes ineffective assistance under Strickland.143 
In Lafler v. Cooper, a case decided the same day as Frye, the Court extended 
 
139 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1145 (2011) (noting that Strickland had long been 
viewed as “toothless”). 
140 See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, 
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 809 (4th ed. 2011) (describing defense attorneys who 
have been accused of ineffective assistance under Strickland for “sleeping, being drunk or drugged, 
or otherwise being physically unable to present an effective defense”). 
141 See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding a lawyer’s failure to consult 
with his client about filing an appeal when a rational defendant would want to appeal to be 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
142 See Bibas, supra note 139, at 1145 & n.145 (noting the Court’s recent case law on the duty 
to investigate in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); 
and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)). 
143 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). 
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Frye’s application of Strickland for plea offers to a case where a lawyer gave 
erroneous advice about a plea, resulting in the defendant’s rejection of the 
plea.144 That defendant’s case was on postconviction review, signaling that 
the rules are retroactive and thus, presumably, not new.145 Both cases relied 
on “the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of 
pleas, not a system of trials.”146 Indeed, as the Court noted in Frye, about 
ninety-five percent of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas, making 
plea bargains “central to the administration of the criminal justice system.”147 
Perhaps the Court is telling us that we have been misunderstanding 
what Strickland really required all along.148 Professor Josh Bowers views the 
Court’s approach to guilty pleas in Padilla as similar to its past approach: 
“the fairness principles that animate the Court’s decision in Padilla are the 
same principles that have animated its guilty-plea and plea-bargaining juris-
prudence all along.”149 He views Padilla as a “potentially substantial step down 
a well-worn path,” “an unfamiliar result reached through familiar means.”150  
But others see Padilla as a remarkable change of direction in the Court’s 
plea jurisprudence. Professor Stephanos Bibas has described Padilla as a 
“tremor” resulting in “large shifts in landscape”—“the dawn of a new era” in 
the Court’s regulation of plea bargaining.151 Justice Alito’s description of the 
decision suggests that he views it similarly, calling it a “dramatic departure 
from precedent,” a “new approach,” and a “major upheaval in Sixth 
Amendment law.”152 The Court has continued to look to Padilla in cases 
that have expanded the protections available to those who plead guilty, 
relying on the Padilla rule to bolster its analysis in both Lafler and Frye.153 
And Chaidez’s labeling of Padilla as “new” seems to validate these views. 
The Court described the Padilla decision as having “breach[ed] the previously 
 
144 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390-91 (2012). 
145 Id. at 1390; see also In re Graham, 714 F.3d 1181, 1182 (10th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases that 
conclude that Lafler did not establish a new rule of constitutional law). 
146 Id. at 1388; see also Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
147 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (citations omitted). 
148 The Court has not told us whether other recent ineffective assistance cases apply retroac-
tively. See, e.g., Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646, 654 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that whether Roe 
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), “constitutes an ‘old’ rule for retroactivity purposes is a 
question of first impression”). 
149 Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello to Padilla: A Response to 
Professor Bibas, 2 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 54 (2011).  
150 Id. 
151 Bibas, supra note 139, at 1137-39. 
152 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
153 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405-�� (����); Lafler v. Cooper, ��� S. Ct. ����, 
1384 (2012). 
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chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences.”154 If that did 
not count as “break[ing] new ground,” the Court continued, “we are hard 
pressed to know what would.”155 These various descriptions, and the simple 
designation of Padilla as “new,” seem to confirm that Padilla changed the 
world of plea bargaining law in a way that was different from the Court’s 
previous cases.  
Padilla’s newness validates the concerns Justice Alito expressed in his 
concurrence in that case. Had Padilla been a simple application of Strick-
land, it is possible that it would not have led to arguments for expanding its 
rationale even further, to other collateral consequences. Many collateral 
consequences besides removal may follow a criminal conviction; now that 
the Court has broken new ground by finding that one technically “collat-
eral” consequence falls within the scope of Strickland, future litigants will 
argue that this new rule should be extended to those other consequences. As 
Justice Alito put it,  
 This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can car-
ry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing, 
including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, 
disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dis-
honorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or profes-
sional licenses.156  
Padilla and the Court’s other recent plea bargaining cases may dramati-
cally shape the landscape of habeas litigation going forward, even though 
Chaidez has told us Padilla cannot do so retroactively. Typically, defendants 
entering guilty pleas waive their rights to appeal most issues,157 so most 
habeas petitioners are defendants who went to trial.158 Thus, for those who 
plead guilty, ineffective assistance may be the one claim that remains 
available.159 When Strickland claims were practically impossible to win, this 
 
154 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110 (2013). 
155 Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
156 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). 
157 Bibas, supra note 139, at 1123; see also MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 1592-93 (3d ed. 2007) 
(noting limits on the claims available to habeas petitioners who have pleaded guilty). 
158 Habeas petitioners are much more likely to have been convicted at trial than to have 
pleaded guilty, and to have been convicted of more serious offenses with longer sentences. See MILLER 
& WRIGHT, supra note 157, at 1592. One study found that while the jury trial rate for felonies in urban 
areas was 6%, 62% of state court petitioners and 66% of federal petitioners had gone to trial. Id. 
159 The same study found that between 41% and 45% of all habeas petitioners (both those 
who went to trial and those who pleaded guilty) raised the claim of ineffective assistance of 
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meant that few claims by defendants who pleaded guilty were likely to be 
successful. But as the Court expands the scope of plea bargaining issues 
cognizable under Strickland, the potential for litigation likewise expands. 
Because defendants who plead guilty so significantly outnumber those who 
go to trial, the number of defendants getting access to more claims may be 
growing exponentially.  
C. The Future of Strickland and Teague 
The Court, by finding Padilla to be new, avoided a difficult issue, one it 
should confront if it ever decides a Strickland-based rule is retroactive. 
Strickland defines reasonableness in part by prevailing professional norms, 
norms that evolve and change over time. As the Court in Padilla stated, the 
professional norms instructing defense attorneys to provide removal advice 
had existed for “at least the past 15 years.”160 The Padilla Court’s identifica-
tion of a specific point in time at which norms changed highlights the 
challenge of Strickland and retroactivity: if norms changed fifteen years ago, 
that would imply that at some point they were new, because at some point 
before norms develop, they do not exist. Assume that Chaidez had adopted 
the dissent’s approach and applied Padilla retroactively. According to the 
Court, the norms were clearly not new fourteen years ago, but were they new 
sixteen years ago? And if Teague only allows retroactive application of rules 
that are not new, what does this mean for applying a rule based on prevailing 
norms to the time period (sixteen years ago, in the Padilla hypothetical) when 
those norms did not yet exist—and so were new?161 Would a habeas petitioner 
whose case became final fifteen years and one month before the Padilla 
decision be unable to take advantage of the rule, since the norms did not exist 
when his case became final (and so to him the rule is new)?162  
Certainly, trying to draw the line between what is new and what is not 
in the context of a constitutional standard that relies on changing norms is 
challenging. The Court avoided this problem in Chaidez because Padilla was 
new, but it is not impossible to imagine other Teague cases in which a 
 
counsel. Id. at 1593. When a defense attorney had failed to explain a plea agreement and its 
consequences adequately, petitioners often claimed they were misled into making the plea. Id.  
160 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (majority opinion). 
161 Cf. id. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Although we may appropriately 
consult standards promulgated by private bar groups, we cannot delegate to these groups our task 
of determining what the Constitution commands.” (citation omitted)). 
162 It is not impossible (although it is difficult) for habeas petitioners to raise claims related 
to convictions that are as many as twenty years old. See, e.g., Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794, 796 
(2005) (considering a habeas claim from a defendant convicted of a crime committed in 1985). 
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petitioner has prevailed by arguing that a norm had developed that made 
her defense counsel’s conduct a violation of Strickland. Indeed, Justice 
Sotomayor argued as much in Chaidez, noting that the only change Padilla 
prompted in the law was that “the underlying professional norms” meant 
“that counsel’s failure to give this advice now amounted to constitutionally 
deficient performance.”163 Again, because Strickland is premised on norms, 
which change and evolve, this problem is not unique to Padilla; it could 
come up any time the Court recognizes a norm that makes defense counsel’s 
behavior ineffective under Strickland.164 
One solution would be for courts to grant a habeas petitioner the benefit 
of retroactive Strickland-based rules only if the petitioner can show that the 
rule was not new at the time the alleged violation took place. But that 
would require courts to determine, potentially, on which month norms 
flipped—and would that not vary by geographic location? It certainly seems 
likely that the Padilla norms would have developed in border states or urban 
areas like New York before they developed in rural South Dakota. There 
will not always be a statute or case to pinpoint the exact date, so it becomes 
impossible to know what the judge should or would look to in making his 
decision. Not only would this require a difficult factual finding by judges, 
but it also would ask them to make a tricky legal determination, balancing a 
Strickland standard based on local customs and norms with Teague’s empha-
sis on uniformity in the treatment of criminal defendants. Any time a 
Strickland rule is premised on issues that might be more salient in some 
parts of the country than in others, retroactivity could vary. But equality is 
central, according to Teague, to deciding whether a rule is new. Given the 
reliance on changing norms, the implication for making Strickland rules 
retroactive is that similarly situated litigants—habeas petitioners—may be 
treated differently depending on whether they were convicted in a part of 
the country that developed the relevant norms earlier or later.  
It seems arbitrary to enforce retroactively any rule that is the product of 
changing norms, since at some point those norms must have been new—but 
by definition, Strickland rules will often be the products of changing norms, 
and the Court has never suggested that this would prevent their retroactivity. 
Certainly the Court in Chaidez did not imply that future Strickland cases 
 
163 Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1116 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
164 In fact, the puzzle of how to identify an evolving constitutional norm comes up in other 
areas as well. In the oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry, Justice Scalia pressed respondents’ 
counsel Ted Olson to provide a date on which it became unconstitutional to prohibit gay marriage, 
and Mr. Olson stated that he could provide no specific date, because it was “an evolutionary 
cycle.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-
144), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-144.pdf. 
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that rely on developing norms can never be retroactive. But the inherent 
messiness of this determination suggests that not just Padilla, but perhaps 
any Strickland rule that relies on changing norms, is simply too complicated 
to be made retroactive.  
These questions implicate a more fundamental conflict, between the na-
ture of habeas review and the Strickland rule. How do we balance habeas—
seen as the last safety valve to protect fundamental rights, rather than the 
point at which to litigate garden-variety claims—with Strickland standards 
that evolve over time, typically through incremental litigation? The issue 
comes down to what we think we are doing when we permit habeas litiga-
tion. Courts often speak of habeas as a final backstop to protect essential 
rights and freedoms, to ensure that the innocent are set free165—not to 
permit endless litigation over mistakes not implicating those fundamental 
issues. But postconviction review often will be the first time defendants can 
raise Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claims.166 Thus, Strickland 
roots the development of ineffective assistance claims on the evolution of 
norms—norms that must evolve through litigation on habeas. But because 
habeas has traditionally been about the enforcement of clearly established 
rights, not the development of new norms and claims, it is hard to see how 
the purposes of both Strickland and habeas can be served simultaneously in 
postconviction litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s opinion in Chaidez made the question of Padilla’s retroac-
tive application seem quite simple, with its argument that the fact that 
Strickland could even apply to claims like Jose Padilla’s and Roselva 
Chaidez’s represented a new direction for the Court. But the decision left 
open whether other claims—claims that attorneys actively misled defend-
ants—might still be available retroactively. As the Court continues to grant 
more expansive protection to criminal defendants who plead guilty, difficult 
questions will also arise regarding how to deal with retroactivity under a 
standard that relies on norms that evolve over time. Just as the Court 
changed its approach to retroactivity in Teague, reacting to the Warren 
 
165 See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 685-87 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
166 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30 (claiming that Padilla-type claims “must be 
litigated in . . . initial-review collateral proceedings” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 508-09 (2003) (permitting federal 
petitioners to raise ineffective assistance claims for the first time on collateral review). 
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Court’s increasing protections for criminal defendants, so too must the 
Roberts Court reevaluate how it will deal with retroactivity in Strickland cases, 
against the backdrop of changing protections for defendants who plead guilty. 
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